Large Population Games on Constrained Unreliable Networks

Abstract

This paper studies an N--agent cost-coupled game where the agents are connected via an unreliable capacity constrained network. Each agent receives state information over that network which loses packets with probability p. A Base station (BS) actively schedules agent communications over the network by minimizing a weighted Age of Information (WAoI) based cost function under a capacity limit C < N on the number of transmission attempts at each instant. Under a standard information structure, we show that the problem can be decoupled into a scheduling problem for the BS and a game problem for the N agents. Since the scheduling problem is an NP hard combinatorics problem, we propose an approximately optimal solution which approaches the optimal solution as N . In the process, we also provide some insights on the case without channel erasure. Next, to solve the large population game problem, we use the mean-field game framework to compute an approximate decentralized Nash equilibrium. Finally, we validate the theoretical results using a numerical example.

Tasks

Reproductions