Evaluating adversarial attacks against multiple fact verification systems

Abstract

Automated fact verification has been progressing owing to advancements in modeling and availability of large datasets. Due to the nature of the task, it is critical to understand the vulnerabilities of these systems against adversarial instances designed to make them predict incorrectly. We introduce two novel scoring metrics, attack potency and system resilience which take into account the correctness of the adversarial instances, an aspect often ignored in adversarial evaluations. We consider six fact verification systems from the recent Fact Extraction and VERification (FEVER) challenge: the four best-scoring ones and two baselines. We evaluate adversarial instances generated by a recently proposed state-of-the-art method, a paraphrasing method, and rule-based attacks devised for fact verification. We find that our rule-based attacks have higher potency, and that while the rankings among the top systems changed, they exhibited higher resilience than the baselines.

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Reproductions