SOTAVerified

EigenGame: PCA as a Nash Equilibrium

2020-10-01ICLR 2021Code Available1· sign in to hype

Ian Gemp, Brian McWilliams, Claire Vernade, Thore Graepel

Code Available — Be the first to reproduce this paper.

Reproduce

Code

Abstract

We present a novel view on principal component analysis (PCA) as a competitive game in which each approximate eigenvector is controlled by a player whose goal is to maximize their own utility function. We analyze the properties of this PCA game and the behavior of its gradient based updates. The resulting algorithm -- which combines elements from Oja's rule with a generalized Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization -- is naturally decentralized and hence parallelizable through message passing. We demonstrate the scalability of the algorithm with experiments on large image datasets and neural network activations. We discuss how this new view of PCA as a differentiable game can lead to further algorithmic developments and insights.

Reproductions