Protecting Federated Learning from Extreme Model Poisoning Attacks via Multidimensional Time Series Anomaly Detection
Edoardo Gabrielli, Dimitri Belli, Zoe Matrullo, Vittorio Miori, Gabriele Tolomei
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Current defense mechanisms against model poisoning attacks in federated learning (FL) systems have proven effective up to a certain threshold of malicious clients. In this work, we introduce FLANDERS, a novel pre-aggregation filter for FL resilient to large-scale model poisoning attacks, i.e., when malicious clients far exceed legitimate participants. FLANDERS treats the sequence of local models sent by clients in each FL round as a matrix-valued time series. Then, it identifies malicious client updates as outliers in this time series by comparing actual observations with estimates generated by a matrix autoregressive forecasting model maintained by the server. Experiments conducted in several non-iid FL setups show that FLANDERS significantly improves robustness across a wide spectrum of attacks when paired with standard and robust existing aggregation methods.